Introduction
This standard specifies how to bind a Certificate Image to a certificate (defined in [RFC5280] ), providing a visual representation of that certificate using the Logotype extension defined in [RFC3709] , specifying the Certificate Image as a new otherLogos type.
The purpose of the Certificate image is to aid human interpretation of a certificate by providing meaningful visual information to the user interface.
Typical situations when a human needs to examine the visual representation of a certificate are: -A person establishes secured channel with an authenticated service. The person needs to determine the identity of the service based on the authenticated credentials.
-A person validates the signature on critical information, such as signed executable code, and needs to determine the identity of the signer based on the signer's certificate.
-A person is required to select an appropriate certificate to be used when authenticating to a service or Identity Management infrastructure. The person needs to see the available certificates in order to distinguish between them in the selection process.
Display of certificate information to humans is challenging due to lack of well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes. Unless the application has out of band knowledge about a particular certificate, the application will not know the exact nature of the data stored in common identification attributes such as serialNumber, organizationName, country, etc. Consequently the application can display the actual data, but faces problem to label that data in the UI, informing the human about the exact nature (semantics) of that data. It is also challenging for the application to determine which identification attribute that are important to display and how to organize them in a logical order.
RFC 3709 [RFC3709] defines a certificate extension for binding images to a certificate, such as community logo and issuer logo, enhancing display of certificate information. The syntax is extensible and allows inclusion of new image types using the other-Logos structure. This standard defines how to include a complete certificate image using the extensibility mechanism of RFC 3709. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
Certificate Image
This section defines the Certificate Image as a new otherLogos type according to section 4.1 of [RFC3709] .
The Certificate Image otherLogos type is identified by the Object Identifier (OID) id-logo-certimage.
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet (1) security (5) The language tag may carry information about the the language used to express any textual elements within the image as well as any audio information associated with the image.
When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a certificate image, the parameters shall be used with the following semantics and restrictions.
xSize and ySize represents recommended display size for the image. When a value of 0 (zero) is present, no recommended display size specified. When non-zero values are present and these values differ from corresponding size values in the referenced image file, then the referenced image SHOULD be scaled to fit within the size parameters of LogotypeImageInfo, while keeping x and y ratio intact.
The resolution parameter is redundant for all image formats that are relevant for certificate images and MUST NOT be specified. When including the image data in the logotype extension using the "data" URL scheme the following conventions apply.
-the value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails MUST be identical to the media type value in the "data" URL.
-The hash of the image MUST be included in logotypeHash and MUST be calculated over the same data as it would have been, had the image been referenced through a link to an external resource.
Note: As the "data" URL scheme is processed as a data source rather than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited by any URL length limit setting that otherwise apply to URLs in general.
Note: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of images included in a certificate in order to ensure that the size of the certificate does not prevent the certificate to be used as intended. The following MIME media type, defined in Appendix M of [SVGT] , MUST be included as mediaType in LogotypeDetails for all SVG and SVGZ images:
image/svg+xml When the SVG image is embedded using the "data" URL scheme as defined in section 4, SVG image data MUST be provided in SVGZ (GZIP compressed) form (i.e. it MUST NOT be provided in uncompressed SVG form).
Compliant implementations of this specification SHOULD be able to process SVG images that are formatted according to this section. -include malicious data that could exploit known security bugs in common software libraries used to render graphical images.
This underlines the necessity for CAs to provide reliable services and the relying party's responsibility and need to carefully select which CA that is trusted to provide public key certificates.
This also underlines the general necessity for relying parties to use up-to-date software libraries to render or dereference data from external sources (such as certificates) to minimize risks related to processing potentially malicious data before the data has been adequately verified and validated.
Referenced image files are hashed in order to bind the image to the signature of the certificate. Some image types, such as SVG allow part of the image to be collected from external source by incorporating a reference to an external image file. If this feature were used within a certificate image file, the hash of the image file would only cover the URI reference to the external image file, but not the referenced image data. Clients SHOULD verify that SVGT images meets all requirements of section 5.2 and reject images that contain references to external data.
CAs issuing certificate with embedded certificate images should be cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requestor for inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks. In such case the accepted image may contain data that could help an attacker to obtain colliding certificates with identical certificate signatures.
Certificates, and hence their cert images, are commonly public objects and as such usually will not contain privacy sensitive The following example stores an embedded svgz encoded SVG image using the "data" URL scheme. 
